Part 5: Why Do Governments Keep “Backdoors”? (Network Security)

What Is a “Backdoor”?

A “backdoor” refers to a software backdoor — a secret entry point that bypasses normal security mechanisms and allows a third party to directly access a system or communication channel.

During software development, backdoors can be useful for modifying and testing code defects. But if a backdoor becomes known to others (through leaks or discovery), or if it is not removed before software is released, it poses a threat to the security of phones or computer systems.

Why Do Governments Insist on Communication Backdoors? Is Opening Backdoors in the Name of “National Security” Justified?

Many governments around the world have long advocated and legislated that, in order to combat terrorism, transnational crime, and information warfare, they must retain some form of access to communications. Thus, “backdoors” are packaged as a national security requirement. In reality, they give governments the ability to monitor all communications without user consent. The problem: a backdoor does not open only for the government. Once an access point exists, other nations, hackers, and criminal organizations can all find ways to obtain the same access.

CCP Hackers Infiltrate All Telecom Carriers — Donald Trump Was Also Monitored Before the Election

The White House recently warned that a hacker group backed by China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), known as Salt Typhoon, has successfully infiltrated telecom carriers in dozens of countries worldwide, posing a major threat to global communications infrastructure.

Salt Typhoon has been active since 2019 and drew international attention in 2023–2024 for large-scale attacks on multiple U.S. telecom service providers. According to the U.S. government and multiple media reports, affected companies include major carriers such as Verizon, AT&T, and Lumen Technologies. Hackers gained access to communication records and sensitive information by compromising core network equipment and telecom infrastructure.

Multiple intelligence reports indicate that Salt Typhoon’s operations bear the hallmarks of state backing. The U.S. has determined that the group has a direct association with China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) and has long targeted critical infrastructure in various countries.

Notably, during Donald Trump’s second presidential campaign, hackers obtained the call records and text messages of his campaign advisors in an attempt to influence the election — elevating the incident to a national security level. This event is regarded as a major cybersecurity threat to the U.S. democratic process and highlights that once telecom infrastructure is compromised, politicians, businesses, and ordinary citizens may all become surveillance targets without their knowledge.

Telecom Carriers Are No Longer Safe — Only Self-Built Servers Are

In modern communications, every call and every message must travel through a telecom carrier’s lines. Yet the reality is that these seemingly secure carriers have long been infiltrated by state-level hackers. In this environment, no matter how careful users are, they cannot truly control the security of their own communications.

Therefore, if you want to truly achieve “non-interception,” “non-surveillance,” and “non-analysis,” the only way is to not travel on others’ lines, but on your own servers.

This is the core philosophy of SyPhone — self-built and dedicated servers mean communications no longer pass through others’ infrastructure. Only by controlling your own communication path can you truly control your own security.

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